University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2013

Aesthetic Functionality
Michael S. Mireles Jr.
University of the Pacific, mmireles@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Mireles Jr., Aesthetic Functionality, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles/534

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

21 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 155
Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal
2013
Article
AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
Michael S. Mireles, Jr.a1

Copyright (c) 2013 Intellectual Property Law Section of the State Bar of Texas; Michael S. Mireles, Jr.
I.

Introduction

156

II.

Troubling Trademarks: Cumulative Excess

157

III.

The Functionality Doctrine

162

A. Functionality Doctrine and Trade Dress: The Cases

163

1. Trademark Eligible Subject Matter

163

2. Functionality

166

a. The Purpose of Functionality

166

b. Functionality Doctrine Quagmire

169

B. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Cases Related to Functionality

169

1. Qualitex, Wal-Mart, and Two Pesos

169

2. TrafFix and More Confusion

173

C. Aesthetic Functionality, the Lower Courts and Modest Proposals

175

1. Pagliero

176

2. Cases Interpreting Pagliero

179

a. Wallace

179

b. Ferrari

180

c. Boston Professional Hockey

180

d. Job’s Daughters

181

e. Vuitton

183

IV.

V.

f. Au-Tomotive Gold

184

g. Jay Franco

188

3. Proposal

188

Potential New Applications of the Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine

190

A. Policing the Subject Matter Between Copyright and Trademark Law

190

1. Comparing Copyright and Patent Law, and an Examination of Trademark Law

191

2. Dastar and the A.V.E.L.A. Opinions

195

B. Defensive Aesthetic Functionality

202

1. Merchandising and University of Alabama Board of Trustees

202

2. Market Definition

205

C. Non-Defensive Aesthetic Functionality in Industry Specific Contexts

209

Conclusion

212

*156 I. Introduction
The legal protection offered by trademark law has expanded significantly since the passage of the Lanham Act and threatens
competition and values such as free speech.1 Perhaps most troubling, this expansion has resulted in cumulative protection--a
layer of protection built upon another layer and so on. For example, the subject matter of trademark protection has grown and
at the same time so has the scope of protection. Meanwhile, some trademark defenses, at least in the context of dilution, have
been circumscribed. This Article proposes that the functionality doctrine--and particularly aesthetic functionality--can limit
the cumulative excesses of trademark law.
Functionality is perhaps the most convoluted of all of trademark’s doctrines. As Professors Dinwoodie and Janis have noted,
there is disagreement concerning the rationale for and the scope of the doctrine.2 Indeed, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s
apparent approval and signaling, lower courts still discount or ignore the aesthetic functionality doctrine. This Article reviews
and analyzes the purpose of the doctrine, the leading Supreme Court cases attempting to clarify the doctrine, and the lower
court cases that have confused the field. This Article agrees with the observation that the doctrine is muddled and proposes
that the doctrine be expanded instead of reigned in.3 The rationale of protecting competition should be embraced *157 and
functionality should be used to ensure that trademark law does not inhibit competition to the detriment of consumers. This
Article proposes that courts apply a consumer motivation test and a competitive necessity test based on alternatives, in
analyzing aesthetic functionality. This Article also proposes that courts apply a presumption favoring aesthetic functionality
where there is a factual ambiguity or close question.
This Article relies on several cases that demonstrate how aesthetic functionality can be used to suppress the cumulative
excesses of trademark law. Based on those cases, this Article first proposes that functionality be used to police the boundary
of copyright and trademark to prevent trademark protection of subject matter ordinarily protected by copyright law or in the
public domain. Second, this Article asserts that aesthetic functionality is used in its defensive sense to relieve some alleged
infringers or diluters from trademark infringement or dilution. Finally, this Article argues that functionality can be used as a
policy lever to exempt certain subject matter from trademark protection in industries where that subject matter is fundamental
to innovation in that field. Again, these three uses of functionality should be moored to the protection of competition.
The first section is a brief introduction. The second section discusses the troubling nature of trademark law and its cumulative
excesses. The third section provides a discussion of the functionality doctrine with an emphasis on aesthetic functionality.

The fourth section analyzes three new roles for aesthetic functionality to restrain trademark law’s cumulative excesses.
Finally, a brief conclusion is offered.
II. Troubling Trademarks: Cumulative Excess
The scope of legal protection for trademarks has expanded greatly in the last century.4 From the recognition of new subject
matter of trademarks to new causes of action, trademark owners have benefited from additional protection. Trademark
owners have pursued this protection because of the increased importance of the brand in establishing and building goodwill,
and expanding into new product, service, and geographic markets, particularly with the advent of globalization and use of the
Internet.5 Diligent trademark owners--spurred by the structure and policy of trademark law and the value of the brand--are
motivated to vigorously protect their trademarks through policing efforts and to stop the proliferation of counterfeit goods.6
Notably, many trademark owners are successful not only in the *158 marketplace, but also in obtaining additional trademark
protection through new legislation.7 Scholars and courts have criticized the expanding nature of trademark protection, which
may harm competition and impinge on socially important values, such as free expression.8
Attempts at reigning in the scope of trademark protection have been relatively unsuccessful,9 whether through the application
of limiting doctrines such as the trademark use requirement to the scope of trademark causes of action or through legislated
limitations to dilution. The law of dilution’s recent expansion is troubling because of its relatively weak support in trademark
theory such as the consumer search costs theory.10 One example of dilution’s expansion includes recent case law eroding the
requirement that a mark achieve wide recognition amongst the general consuming public, weakening the limiting provision in
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA) designed to eliminate “niche fame.”11 The erosion of this requirement
is troubling because dilution extends trademark protection beyond marks that are in competitive or related markets to those
that may be in completely unrelated markets--essentially providing those marks with a right in gross in the trademark.12 The
family of marks doctrine *159 coupled with dilution may also provide multiple marks an even broader penumbra of
protection over similar marks on goods or services.13 Another development in courts’ interpretation of the TDRA is the
elimination of a “near identical or identical” requirement between two marks when considering whether there has been
blurring-type dilution.14 Moreover, at least one appellate court is applying a presumption of likelihood of dilution by
tarnishment if the subject matter of the alleged diluter’s use of the mark is of a sexual nature.15 Also, the TDRA has arguably
narrowed some defenses concerning matters such as parody only to uses “otherwise than as a mark,” thus limiting the
circumstances in which express exclusions under the TDRA may apply.16 Finally, the Supreme Court previously interpreted
the predecessor legislation to the TDRA, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FDA), as only applying in cases of
actual dilution and cast doubt on whether dilution by tarnishment existed under the FDA.17 The subsequent TDRA expressly
requires a likelihood of dilution and includes a cause of action for tarnishment.18
Besides dilution, courts continue to apply sponsorship, association and other types of confusion in general likelihood of
confusion matters, which expands the scope of protection of marks beyond competitive or related goods.19 Also, in
infringement actions, a particularly strong or famous mark may receive protection well beyond the class of goods or services
with which it was first used and even receive a prior use date over a similar mark used on somewhat related goods or
services.20 Moreover, confusion is assessed beyond the point of sale to include *160 post-sale and initial interest confusion.21
And, courts have recognized a right in the mark itself--a merchandising right.22 The creation of defenses to likelihood of
confusion in some ways continues to be an ad-hoc exercise--for example, in the free speech arena there are multiple tests that
courts apply across jurisdictions that fail to provide certainty to those who create or innovate using the trademarks of others.23
The nominative fair use approach is only recognized in some jurisdictions and courts do not use it consistently.24
The potential subject matter of trademark law has also expanded.25 Additionally, substantial benefits are attached to federal
registration--such as access to incontestability status, prima facie evidence of validity, and nationwide constructive use--and
are expressly provided to word and design marks as well as trade dress.26 Trade dress may include product design and
packaging as well as color alone.27
Potentially, subject matter protected by other areas of intellectual property could obtain unlimited trademark law protection.28
For example, a patent receives *161 relatively limited protection--20 years from the filing date29--but trademark protection
lasts as long as the mark continues to be used and does not end unless there is a reason, such as abandonment, genericide, or
functionality.30 Similarly, the general term for copyright protection is life of the author plus 70 years.31 Thus, with a typical
example, a particular iteration of a character can lose protection under copyright law because of an expiration of term, but
conceivably receive protection under trademark law for a longer period of time.32 Trademark protection could extend into the

realm of copyright law and remove something from the public domain.33 Perhaps this would be less troubling if trademark
law was limited to a likelihood as to confusion of source, but with the availability of dilution protection as well as confusion
as to sponsorship and association, the scope of trademark protection dangerously approaches in gross protection of the mark
itself, giving the mark potential protection close to or beyond that provided by copyright law.34
Unfortunately, the downside of the expansive nature of trademark law is not compartmentalized to the discrete issues raised
before. A troubling aspect about trademark law is that the problems tend to be cumulative. Thus, once you extend the subject
matter of trademarks expressly that subject matter receives the benefits of federal registration. Not only does it receive those
benefits, but also it then receives potential protection under a broad infringement cause of action, including sponsorship and
association confusion, not just source confusion. And, the trademark owner, subject to some eroding requirements such as
fame, receives almost in gross rights in that trademark.35 Finally, the trademark owner has the alleged infringer or diluter at a
disadvantage because the defenses involved in a trademark action are either ill-defined or limited.36
*162 Underlying those potential problems with trademark law is the fundamental issue with the reactive nature of trademark
law.37 The protection under trademark law tends to expand through the manipulation of consumer perception by the
trademark owner.38 As consumers begin to believe that licensing is necessary before someone can use another’s trademark,
there is more likely to be source or sponsorship and association confusion.39 The stronger a trademark owner’s mark becomes
through advertising (and policing incentivized through the structure of trademark law),40 the more likely consumers believe
that licensing is needed.41 Trademark owners are thus, in large part, in control of the scope of protection of their marks and
are able to obtain broad protection under trademark law through its relatively malleable standards, such as the likelihood of
confusion or dilution tests.42 Inherently, the consumer search cost theory often raised as the justification for trademark law
fails to provide meaningful limits--as consumer confusion remains possible, so must trademark protection expand.43
III. The Functionality Doctrine
The functionality doctrine can be characterized in many ways, but few would call its scope and application clear. In fact, one
leading trademark casebook notes *163 that few scholars agree as to the doctrine’s scope and purposes.44 Recently, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed trade dress, a subject area where functionality doctrine ordinarily applies, and functionality directly
and indirectly in several cases.45 Many appellate courts and district courts have also applied the functionality doctrine in
various contexts, whether with product packaging or design trade dress.46 Parties have also raised functionality in the context
of ordinary “word marks,” “design marks,” and even in subject matter areas where trademark law is rarely implicated.47 In
examining those cases, courts apply the functionality doctrine in either its utilitarian or aesthetic format.48
In light of the expansion of trademark eligible subject matter, functionality--particularly aesthetic functionality--offers the
promise of reigning in the excesses of trademark law. This section will examine trademark eligible subject matter and then
the purposes of the functionality doctrine. Next, this section will analyze uses of the functionality doctrine with trade dress,
including the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing functionality.
A. Functionality Doctrine and Trade Dress: The Cases
This section discusses the broad and fluid nature of trademark eligible subject matter. This section also examines the
purposes and evolution of the functionality doctrine, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of functionality, with
specific emphasis on the aesthetic functionality doctrine.
1. Trademark Eligible Subject Matter
Trademark eligible subject matter is exceptionally broad.49 Consumers can attach a “trademark meaning” to almost any
symbol or device.50 Thus, any symbol or device that serves to identify and distinguish one entity’s goods and services from
another’s and to indicate the source of the goods or services is capable of protection as a trademark.51 And, any entity desiring
protection can attempt to *164 imbue its mark with trademark protection by influencing consumer perception with
advertising. Entities will attempt to do so even if that symbol or device is not what a consumer ordinarily considers a
trademark. Consumers alone can give a particular symbol or device a trademark meaning.52 Notably, the value of some brands
is in the billions of dollars53 and unsurprisingly trademark holders desire to expand and protect the value of their brands.
Therefore, the subject matter of trademark protection is broad and will continue to expand.

Scholars have noted the circular effect of the ability of trademark owners to influence the perceptions of consumers, thus
creating the consumer expectation that a particular symbol or device is a trademark and that permission is required to use the
supposed trademark.54 This effect leads to an expansion of trademark scope and is reinforced by continued use and
advertising.55 And, because consumer perception is so critical to determining subject matter, it also has the effect of
influencing the scope of trademark protection. This makes it very difficult to separate questions of what is trademark subject
matter from what is the scope of trademark protection.56 Indeed, there may be very little distinction between the actual subject
matter of trademark--what can serve as a trademark--and the scope of protection one may receive for a trademark.57
Logically, first you would ask whether something falls within trademark subject matter and then address scope, but the
questions are intertwined given the nature of what a trademark can be and how scope may be determined. Moreover, there
have been questions as to whether some unusual marks may be protected, such as sounds, smells or colors, and those
questions have for the most part been answered affirmatively: those types of unusual marks can be protected by trademark
law as long as they serve a trademark function.58 However, the tests for likelihood of confusion and dilution define the
boundaries of all marks.
*165 There are some express restrictions on subject matter that are limited in scope, particularly with respect to federal
registration on the Principal Register. For example, immoral or scandalous marks may be denied registration,59 as well as
specific symbols such as national flags or names of presidents.60 However, these restrictions are relatively narrow.61
While trademark eligible subject matter is broad and easily expanded for the stated reasons, there are other more utilized
limitations. In order for a trademark to receive protection, it must be used in commerce.62 Foundationally, this provides the
first opportunity for an entity to receive trademark protection because consumers can view the mark as a trademark--the
psychological function of the mark is implicated and protection may arise for that mark.63 Some symbols or devices may
never receive trademark protection because they may be classified as generic when used on certain goods or services: a
consumer will believe the mark is there to specify what the good or service is and competitors may need to use that mark to
accurately identify their own goods or services.64 Furthermore, marks may not be protected if they are categorized as
deceptive in connection with goods or services.65 Marks also may not be protected if they are merely descriptive of goods or
services and secondary meaning is not present.66 Thus, for many potential marks, trademark protection is fluid--it is not
bounded by specific subject matter, but changes depending on the use of the mark in connection with specific goods and
services. Unlike patent law, which excludes subject matter such as an abstract idea or natural phenomena--which alone
should never be patentable67--and copyright law, which prohibits copyright protection of methods of operation and
processes,68 trademark law generally does not limit subject matter in the same way, *166 with perhaps one major exception.69
The functionality doctrine can exclude a substantial amount of material from trademark protection. The next section
discusses the evolution of the functionality doctrine and proposes that it should be used in many contexts as a restricting
doctrine of trademark subject matter.70
2. Functionality
a. The Purposes of Functionality
The purposes of functionality should be viewed within the context of the purposes of trademark law.71 Trademark law
generally has two purposes: to protect consumers from confusion and to allow producers to protect their goodwill.72 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Qualitex also noted that trademarks serve to reduce consumer search costs: they protect the ability of
consumers to find and purchase goods and services they have enjoyed before.73 Trademarks also incentivize providing goods
and services of a consistent quality.74 However, the overarching purpose of trademark law is to facilitate the market economy
and thus enable robust competition.75 The functionality doctrine, and its concerns with policing the boundaries of trademark
and patent law and protecting robust competition, lies at the heart of this overarching concern.76
The functionality doctrine is an important limitation on trademark law’s two purposes because even if trademark law would
provide protection, the functionality doctrine trumps concerns about preventing consumer confusion or protecting *167
goodwill.77 Thus, a mark is not protected even if consumer confusion would result from an infringing or diluting use of the
supposed trademark and there would be an erosion of the goodwill of the mark owner.78 Accordingly, the protection of the
market economy and competition will override trademark law’s other purposes once it is demonstrated that trademark
protection will undermine the market economy, and thus the benefits of competition. There are other values implicated by
trademark law that also concern functionality such as the protection of free expression, but those uses of the functionality
doctrine are not frequently utilized. Moreover, as discussed below, the use of functionality to police the boundary between

copyright and trademark law is also questioned.79
Historically there are two purposes of functionality: the separation of the subject matter for patent and trademark protection,
and the protection of competition.80 The first purpose is to prevent trademark law from undermining utility patent law by
providing trademark protection for something that falls within patentable subject matter.81 This is particularly troublesome
when a party claims trademark protection for trade dress that is subject to an expired utility patent.82 Here, the assertion of
trademark protection is used to extend intellectual property protection beyond the time prescribed by patent law (20 years
from the filing date).83 The time period for patent protection is constitutionally limited and cannot be for perpetuity.84 Patent
protection is conditioned upon a Patent Office determination that the invention is novel, non-obvious, useful, and in
compliance with the written description and enablement requirements.85 However, a trademark can be protected so long as it
is used in commerce, subject to some exceptions.86 *168 Thus, functionality serves to police trademarkable subject matter or
channel certain subject matter to utility patent law.87
The second rationale is the protection of competition or the right to compete.88 The protection of competition is a somewhat
ambiguous rationale, and the tests that discern whether functionality achieves that purpose generally lack clarity in
application.89 Professor McKenna notes that the protection of competition norm is not well developed.90 Even though the
competition norm may not be well defined, the importance of it cannot be understated. For example, the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition explains the role and benefits of competition:
The freedom to engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a
fundamental premise of the free enterprise system. Competition in the marketing of goods and services
creates incentives to offer quality products at reasonable prices and fosters the general welfare by
promoting the efficient allocation of economic resources. The freedom to compete necessarily
contemplates the probability of harm to the commercial relations of other participants in the market.91 The
protection of competition is particularly important when discussing trademark protection for designs
because the supposed trademark holder could preempt a product market because there may be a limited
number of designs--at least with word marks there may be more potential substitutes for the trademarked
word.92
Despite the ease in stating the purposes, courts have had difficulty applying them. In analyzing functionality doctrine’s
purposes, Professor McKenna has explained how courts have inconsistently applied those purposes.93 He points to two
different approaches to functionality that explains modern doctrine, particularly with respect to so-called “utilitarian”
functionality.94 Some courts focus on “the right of the public to copy unpatented articles.”95 This approach leads to a finding
*169 of functionality in more cases, and “these courts regard patent rights as carefully circumscribed exceptions to a general
right to copy the features of another’s products.”96 Other courts follow a “need to copy” approach.97 This approach finds
functionality in fewer cases, and these courts “view functionality primarily as a safeguard against competitive harm.”98
Professor McKenna argues that the two approaches have roots in case law that illuminates the development of differing
analyses by courts.99
b. Functionality Doctrine Quagmire
One important limitation on what can serve as a trademark is functionality. Although the tests for functionality are easy to
recite, understanding exactly what is and is not functional--whether utilitarian, aesthetic or something else--is no easy task.100
In general terms, one could state that utilitarian functionality (a redundant phrase)101 attempts to prohibit trademark law from
protecting symbols and devices with some utility; aesthetic functionality (a phrase contradicting itself)102 is directed at
symbols and devices that do not have utility, but do have some good reason to prohibit trademark law from protecting
them--usually related to protecting the interests of competitors (and consumers). Answering the question of what is functional
is difficult because identifying which test and how to apply it is complicated.103 In the last 25 years, functionality--as a
doctrine, however defined--has attracted the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court, other courts, and scholars concerned with
trademark law’s potential to inhibit competition.104
B. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Cases Related to Functionality
1. Qualitex, Wal-Mart, and Two Pesos

In Qualitex v. Jacobson, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of whether color alone could be federally registered
as a trademark.105 This case is arguably a trade dress case. It concerns the appearance of the product itself--the color of it--not
a discrete word or design on a product or associated with *170 services.106 As in many intellectual property law cases, the
Supreme Court focused carefully on the language of the relevant statutory scheme, in this case the Lanham Act, to answer the
issue.107 The Court noted the rationale for trademark protection and, after concluding that protecting color alone was
consistent with the Lanham Act, addressed several arguments Jacobson made against Qualitex’s assertion that the green-gold
color should be protected as a trademark.108 One argument against protecting color alone was the so-called “color-depletion”
argument109: there are a limited number of colors available and thus it would inhibit competition to allow one entity to control
or have trademark protection over a color through federal registration--there are not enough colors available.110 In rejecting
this argument, the Court pointed to the functionality doctrine as a guard against problems with “color depletion.”111 In its first
reference to the functionality test, the Court appeared to treat functionality as a unified test or a single inquiry, assuming that
the “use or purpose or affects the cost or quality” test and non-reputation-related disadvantage are interchangeable.112
However, the Court later recognized that color may be, depending on its use, utilitarian or aesthetically functional.113
The Court also suggested that the test for aesthetic functionality may be that trademark law should not put competitors at a
non-reputation-related disadvantage.114 Another statement of this test could be that trademark holders can obtain a
reputation-related advantage through trademarks, but not any other advantage. The question becomes what is a
reputation-related disadvantage versus an acceptable reputation-related advantage. According to the Court, competitive
necessity appears to be the key to answering that question.115
If the Court did apply the functionality doctrine to this case, it appears that the aesthetic version may be the relevant test. The
claimed trade dress-- the color appearing on the product--does not implicate a function of the product itself because it is
merely decorative. Though the Court did note that there may be a functionality argument based on the color of the product
because it might hide stains.116 That assertion is directed at the heart of the purpose of this particular *171 product defined
broadly--to serve as a press pad for clothing. Accordingly, after this case, both the question of the correct test for
functionality and the question of whether utilitarian and aesthetic functionality require different analyses remained
unresolved.
In another U.S. Supreme Court case that indirectly addressed the functionality doctrine, Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, the
Court analyzed whether product design trade dress could be protected without proof of secondary meaning.117 In answering
that question with a no, the Court distinguished another Supreme Court case, Taco Cabana v. Two Pesos, which held that
trade dress could be inherently distinctive.118 According to Wal-Mart, Two Pesos concerned product packaging or something
else and not product design trade dress.119 The Court also rejected an argument by Samara Brothers that the functionality
doctrine would protect competitors against any competition issues that may arise from providing trademark protection to
product design without secondary meaning.120 The Court reasoned that because it is unlikely consumers perceive product
design as a trademark, competition is better served by requiring a supposed trademark owner to prove secondary
meaning--that consumers viewed the product design as a trademark notwithstanding functionality.121 The Court noted that in
close cases a court should presume that asserted trade dress is product design if it is unclear whether trade dress is product
design or packaging.122 In adopting the presumption, the Court expressly rejected an inquiry into the motivations of a
consumer to determine whether something is product design or packaging.123
This case did little to clarify functionality doctrine. This case concerns product design trade dress.124 It dealt with the
particular patterns of appliqués appearing on the product itself, an issue analogous to the color on the product at issue in
Qualitex.125 If functionality did apply to this case, it might be the aesthetic functionality doctrine because it concerns the
appearance of the good and the claimed trade dress does not implicate the utility or function of the clothing. Aesthetic in this
case may refer to particular patterns appearing on the clothing that are attractive to consumers--pleasing aesthetically. Thus,
consumers may purchase the apparel at issue not because it may provide warmth or protection from the sun, for example, but
because the design on the clothing is attractive. However, part of the problem is trying to discern exactly why a consumer
may want to purchase the apparel--is it because of the design or maybe because of the ability of the garment *172 to cover
the wearer? The attempt to divine exactly what the motivation of the consumer may be in purchasing the good is a difficult
one and not entirely unlike the issue of divining why a consumer may enter a particular search term in a search engine--to do
research or to purchase a good or service at that time?126
The resolution of the question of consumer motivation is factually intense and not easily subject to early resolution in an
infringement or dilution case. Determining exactly whether something involves a utilitarian or aesthetic functionality analysis
in the first instance is unclear.127 Moreover, assuming aesthetic functionality analysis should be applied, there is the question

of whether the consumer is purchasing the apparel because the particular design indicates the source of the good--the
trademark function--or because the apparel is pleasing to the eye. If the consumer’s reason to purchase implicates the
trademark function--perhaps an indication of source and maybe level of quality--the mark should not be aesthetically
functional. But consumers may have many different reasons for purchasing the good or service. Courts could attempt to
inquire into the primary motivation for purchasing the good. If it is reputation related, then the mark is not aesthetically
functional. If it is not reputation related, the mark is aesthetically functional. Mixed motives, however, create some issues
with the analysis and disputed fact questions are unlikely to be resolved with a summary judgment motion.
Moreover, that analysis presents the danger of conflating a question of functionality with one of distinctiveness. And, that
analysis could conflate the issue of whether something is functional or ornamental. This problem is likely exacerbated by the
fact that the same evidence may be used to determine distinctiveness and functionality.128 If a trademark function is not
implicated, then the mark does not serve as a trademark at all and should not be protected notwithstanding a functionality
analysis. Assuming the mark did receive some trademark protection, the mark may not be protected if competitors would
need to use that particular design to compete under a functionality analysis. Additionally, perhaps the most difficult question
in functionality analysis asks what is the product or service market the mark implicates and what good or service the mark is
used with. The product market in Wal-Mart could be children’s clothing, one-piece seersucker outfits for children, or
one-piece seersucker outfits with appliqués of hearts and fruit and the like. Assuming it is the last category, competitors may
need to use the same design of appliqués to compete in that market. The question would *173 then turn on whether the
product or service market is defined in a broad or narrow way.129
Another example where aesthetic functionality could apply instead of utilitarian functionality is Two Pesos.130 In that case the
Supreme Court was specifically confronted with the question of whether trade dress may be inherently distinctive.131 The
court answered affirmatively, although this holding has been limited by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart to product packaging
or some “tertium quid.”132 In Two Pesos, the trade dress was the appearance of the restaurant itself, which had no purpose
besides attracting consumers or, relatedly, providing some relevant and pleasing atmosphere.133 Again, trying to determine if
consumers are primarily motivated to purchase food or enjoy the festive décor of the restaurant may be difficult to resolve.
As discussed below, lower courts have approached trade dress by asking whether there is some other purpose of the article.134
2. TrafFix and More Confusion
Finally, the latest Supreme Court case on functionality, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., attempts to clarify
the law of functionality, but in some ways it creates more confusion.135 The issue concerned the effect of an expired utility
patent that covers parts of a product on the ability of those certain parts to serve as protected trade dress.136 Essentially, the
issue is whether a trademark holder can extend protection for claimed elements of its patented invention beyond the term of
the patent with trademark law.137 Before this case, the circuits were split on the impact of a utility patent on trade dress
protection.138 The Court decided that an expired utility patent that claims the asserted trade dress is “strong evidence” that the
trade dress is functional.139 The Court also found that the asserted trade dress, actually the “essential feature” of the trade
dress, was the “central advance” claimed in the expired utility patent.140 After resolving the *174 circuit split, the Court
attempted to clarify the doctrine concerning functionality, which it believed led to confusion in the lower courts.141 Without
explaining the rationales for functionality well, the Court explained that courts that relied upon the “competitive necessity”
test and the consequential existence of alternatives to determine functionality were incorrectly applying Supreme Court
precedent.142 Specifically, the Court stated that the test for determining functionality is in a footnote in the Inwood case: a
product feature cannot serve as a trademark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article.”143 The Court noted there is no need to continue to ask whether there are alternatives if this test is
satisfied.144 The Court also stated that putting a competitor at a non-reputation-related disadvantage was a general statement
of the test in Qualitex,145 and that Qualitex was also a case about aesthetic functionality.146 Thus, the Court appears to
recognize two types of functionality: aesthetic and utilitarian functionality.147 At the same time, the Court seemed to imply the
two tests could be applied sequentially--first, determine if the Inwood test was satisfied, and if that test was satisfied then
look to the competitive necessity test.148 If the asserted trade dress fails either test, then it is functional and not protectable as a
trademark.149
After TrafFix, courts have had some difficulty with applying the functionality doctrine.150 There are many unresolved
questions. Are there two separate tests or just one test?151 How do you prove functionality under the Inwood or competitive
necessity test? What is relevant evidence for proving utilitarian or aesthetic functionality? Are the categories of evidence
discussed by In re Morton-Norwich152 still relevant? How are cases referring to trade dress with aesthetic and utilitarian
elements analyzed?153 Another issue is whether functionality should be limited to trade dress--however that is defined. There

is also a question whether aesthetic functionality exists in some jurisdictions--even after its express recognition by the U.S.
Supreme Court.154 Moreover, if aesthetic functionality *175 exists, is it resolved by applying the Inwood test and the
competitive necessity test, or do you apply only the competitive necessity test?
C. Aesthetic Functionality, the Lower Courts and Modest Proposals
The aesthetic functionality doctrine may have originated with the 1938 First Restatement of Torts.155 The First Restatement of
Torts apparently provides a test for utilitarian functionality: “A feature of goods is functional, under the rule stated in § 741,
if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them; it is
non-functional if it does not have any of such effects.”156 The test recited in section 741 does not appear to implicate
“aesthetics.”157 However, the Comment of the First Restatement provides an example of aesthetic functionality and affirms
the doctrine:
When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely contribute to
that value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended. Thus, the shape of a bottle or other
container may be functional though a different bottle or container may hold the goods equally well. A candy box in the shape
of a heart may be functional, because of its significance as a gift to a beloved one, while a box of a different shape or the
form in which a ribbon is tied around the box may not be functional. Or a distinctive printing typeface may be functional
though the print from a different type may be read equally well. The determination of whether or not such features are
functional depends upon the question of fact whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of something
which will substantially hinder them in competition.
A feature is non-functional if, when omitted, nothing of substantial value in the goods is lost. A feature, which merely
associates goods with a particular source, may be, like a trade-mark or trade name, a substantial factor in increasing the
marketability of the goods. But if that is the entire significance of the feature, it is non-functional; for its value then lies only
in the demand for the goods associated with a particular source rather than for goods of a particular design.158 The examples
seem to define product markets narrowly and therefore accept a broad definition of aesthetic functionality.159 Thus, even if
there is some “alternative” that performs a function equally well, aesthetic functionality allows the use of that item--the
market is defined as a candy box shaped as a heart, not as all candy boxes. Moreover, the Comment does not make a sharp
distinction between claimed marks that serve a trademark function and those that do not.160 *176 Apparently, under the First
Restatement, a mark that serves a trademark function can be aesthetically functional as long as its value is not the “entire
significance of the feature.”161
Over time, despite the guidance of the Restatement and perhaps because of it, courts have had a difficult time applying the
doctrine and some courts have refused to recognize it.162 Part of the underlying problem with the original iterations of the
aesthetic functionality doctrine in case law concerns the focus on consumer perception and motivation, which are inherently
factual questions. As discussed previously, there is an issue as to how and why consumers use the particular trade dress. Is
the trade dress merely ornamental, or perhaps is there some other reason the trade dress is particularly attractive to the
consumer? If the trade dress is merely ornamental, then the trade dress does not serve as a trademark and should not be
protected. Similarly, the trademark will not be distinctive and should be rejected for a lack of either inherent distinctiveness
for product packaging or secondary meaning.163 However, if the asserted trade dress serves a trademark function--not
necessarily just as a source indicator, but maybe also as indicia of quality--is there some other reason for denying trademark
protection based on how the consumer perceives the trade dress. This brings the analysis directly into the factual question.164
The reason is the need to protect competition.165 The problem is whether adequate protection for competition can be achieved
without eviscerating trademarks. The answer is that an analysis of consumer motivations provides focus for the test, and
ambiguities concerning factual evidence and close questions should be resolved in favor of protecting competition. The
following discussion highlights the confusion amongst the courts and the need for a more robust aesthetic functionality test.
1. Pagliero
The Ninth Circuit’s Pagliero v. Wallace China, Co.166 decision is a controversial case at the root of many complaints
concerning the aesthetic functionality doctrine. The court may have impliedly conflated the question of whether a particular
aspect of a product or its packaging is merely ornamental and thus fails to serve as a trademark--a question that should be
asked as to whether trade dress should receive protection in the first instance--and the question of *177 whether the asserted
trade dress itself is functional.167 The Pagliero court also failed to adequately distinguish between utilitarian functionality and

aesthetic functionality.168 These two factors essentially led to the development of several lines of cases reinterpreting,
rejecting, and distinguishing Pagliero.169 Some courts failed to distinguish the ornamental, distinctiveness, or use as a
trademark analysis from functionality--particularly aesthetic functionality--and other courts conflated utilitarian and aesthetic
functionality into a single test.170
In Pagliero, the court addressed whether several designs of vitrified hotel china were functional.171 The court, in deciding the
asserted trade dress was functional, stated that the pattern on china was an “important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product” and indeed had, at least in part, created the “demand” for the product.172 Thus, if the design is an “essential
selling feature” of the product then the trade dress is functional.173 Under this test, any design on a product will be functional
if consumers are attracted to it, which makes determining when something is an “important” or “essential” reason someone
purchases a good a difficult factual question.174 Depending on what is “important” or “essential,” it may be difficult to
conceive of something that is purely an “arbitrary embellishment.”175 Additionally, the fact that a particular design may serve
as a source identifier may be an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.176 The concern with free
competition was the motivating concern *178 articulated by the court.177 As Professors Schechter and Thomas have noted,
there is no mention of an analysis of alternatives that may focus the test.178 Even courts in the Ninth Circuit have criticized
this approach.179
Pagliero can be interpreted as a very broad test for aesthetic functionality, incorporating much more than just those marks
without alternatives.180 Thus, under Pagliero, less trade dress is protected and more asserted trade dress is functional.
Arguably, this is not a desired outcome because it lessens the incentive to develop attractive trade dress and even provides an
incentive to create unattractive trade dress.181 However, this argument is not very persuasive. First, there is still design patent
protection and possibly copyright protection for designs.182 Thus, in analyzing the scope of functionality, an important
consideration should include the relevance of other intellectual property regimes. Second, the market itself provides
incentives to develop new trade dress as firms compete to sell products and services. Third, firms still have access to
traditional word and design marks to identify and distinguish their goods and services from competitors.
Under Pagliero’s test, an inquiry into alternatives should be unnecessary, similar to utilitarian functionality analysis, despite
the language of Qualitex and TrafFix.183 However, the question of whether something is important or essential is still an
ambiguous one, but maybe no more ambiguous than the similar “ambiguous” language used in the Inwood test quoted in
TrafFix. Indeed, the guiding language provided by Pagliero is that if the “design . . . is a mere arbitrary embellishment” and
thus unrelated to consumer demand, then it may be protected and not subject to the functionality doctrine.184 This language is
very similar to that used in TrafFix. A focus on alternatives in aesthetic functionality cases could be used--and may be
consistent with TrafFix and Qualitex--in conjunction with Pagliero’s standard to ensure that trade dress protection is not used
to inhibit competition.
*179 2. Cases Interpreting Pagliero
a. Wallace
As noted previously, many courts have rejected the Pagliero approach; however, some courts have embraced its approach or
at least a modified version of it.185 In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., the Second
Circuit declined to follow Pagliero’s relatively broad test and focused the aesthetic functionality test on whether there were
sufficient alternatives available to competitors so competition would not be impeded.186 The Wallace court, in analyzing
“Baroque style” silverware, adopted the reasoning of prior courts that there would not be an adequate incentive for the
“development of pleasing designs” unless Pagliero was limited.187 However, this court failed to adequately consider the
incentives provided by design patents and copyright law. Moreover, trade dress law is directed toward the goals of trademark
law, and notions of providing incentives for the creation of marks are likely unsupportable by the consumer search costs
rationale.188 The Supreme Court has explained that the rationale for trademark law has very little to do with “invention or
discovery.”189
Thus, the court misunderstood the nature of trademark law, and this reasoning infects other cases as well. The court did find
that Wallace’s claimed trade dress was overbroad and therefore unprotectable by trademark law.190 This holding apparently
was based on reasoning that the concept of Baroque style would be preempted if trade dress protection was granted on the
claimed trade dress by Wallace.191 This puts competitors at a disadvantage because they are unable to utilize the Baroque style
in the Baroque-style silverware market. Under the court’s reasoning, Wallace could have received trade dress protection if the
claimed trade dress was more specific and thus allowed competitors the ability to choose an alternative, non-infringing

version of Baroque-style silverware. If the Wallace court considered the facts of Pagliero, it is likely that Pagliero’s claimed
trade dress likely would still be unprotectable because that particular type of claimed trade dress would foreclose competition
in that market.
*180 b. Ferrari
The Sixth Circuit, following the Second Circuit, in Ferrari indicated that Pagliero’s “important ingredient” test was
unworkable because if the asserted trade dress served as an indication of source, then the test would be met, and the
purported trade dress would not be protected.192 While the Pagliero test could be read to encompass the trademark function of
a design as an “important ingredient” of commercial success, the test could also be read to mean that asserted trade dress
should be scrutinized carefully to determine if the asserted trade dress serves as a trademark and has other purposes. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit in Job’s Daughters and Vuitton attempted to limit Pagliero by stating: “[f]unctional features of a product are
features ‘which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a
particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.”’193 Moreover, courts could address the presence of alternatives to
determine whether trademark protection over the asserted trade dress puts competitors at a non-reputation-related
disadvantage; this serves as an additional test to help courts determine whether trademark protection over the asserted trade
dress impedes competition.
c. Boston Professional Hockey
The Fifth Circuit in Boston Professional Hockey Association addressed the question of whether the use of the trademark of a
hockey team on an emblem (patch) sold by the alleged infringer was a functional use.194 The court distinguished Pagliero by
reasoning that defendant’s use of plaintiffs’ marks created the demand for the product--the demand for the product was
essentially the mark.195 In Boston Hockey, according to the court, there was no demand created by the “attractiveness or
eye-appeal” of the asserted emblem, unlike the design of the china in Pagliero.196 This case appears to have separated the
demand based on the trademark--or for reputation-related reasons--versus any demand based on other reasons, such as
attractiveness of the design. However, there is arguably a distinction between the demand for a trademark because the
purchaser wishes to express loyalty or support for a team by wearing the trademark--perhaps because the person grew up near
the geographic location of the team--and demand for a *181 trademark because of the quality of the team. The former would
seem to provide a reason for demand for the product outside of a reputation-related reason and the latter appears to be related
to reputation. Moreover, demand based on the trademark itself may be narrower than a more general reputation-related
reason. A person may wish to wear the trademark for purely aesthetic reasons because he or she may like the appearance of
the trademark--the design of it-- notwithstanding any reputation attached to the trademark itself.197 The problem with this line
of inquiry is that it draws the court into asking what the motivation of the person purchasing the good or service is.198
Reaching into the subjective state of mind of a particular purchaser is obviously fraught with difficulty.199 However, courts
could carefully scrutinize the evidence and make a finding as to the primary purpose of the consumer. Additionally, courts
could apply a presumption that the primary motivation of the consumer is a non-trademark function in ambiguous cases,
which would provide robust protection for competition. And, again, the court can inquire into alternatives to ascertain
whether competition is adversely impacted. The objective search for alternatives is likely the easier and more certain test to
apply, but both tests could be utilized. Using both inquiries ensures that the court uses all relevant information, including
relevant evidence under the Pagliero test. The court could have disposed of the case under the use requirement, but that
would enable anyone to sell the trademark itself. The extension of this principle to other goods would perhaps erode a
promotional or merchandising right to sell other types of goods or services with the mark besides the “core” goods and
services used with the mark.
d. Job’s Daughters
On relatively similar facts, the Ninth Circuit arrived at a different result than the Boston Hockey case in International Order
of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.200 In Job’s Daughters, the plaintiff, Job’s Daughters, claimed that defendant
Lindeburg infringed its trademark by manufacturing and selling jewelry with Job’s Daughters’ collective mark.201 The Ninth
Circuit held that Lindeburg’s use of the collective mark was a functional use-- specifically an aesthetic functional use.202 The
court stated that, “[t]rademark law does not prevent a person from copying so- *182 called ‘functional’ features of a product
which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular
entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.”203 The court relied upon the Pagliero case, but noted that this case was
distinctive because, “in the context of this case, the name and emblem are functional aesthetic components of the jewelry, in
that they are being merchandised on the basis of their intrinsic value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship.”204 The

court described the “intrinsic value”:
We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing,
and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the organizations we belong to, the schools we attend,
the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these
inscriptions frequently include names and emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks,
it would be naïve to conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the
product somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies.205
Thus, the court noted that the particular use of the collective mark by Lindeburg was not as a collective mark or trademark,
but to demonstrate allegiance--a significant non-trademark function.206 The court also rejected Boston Hockey as providing
too much legal protection for trademarks-- beyond the purposes of trademark law: “to protect consumers against deceptive
designations of the origin of goods and, conversely, to enable producers to differentiate their products from those of
others.”207 The problem with a broader analysis than Boston Hockey is that it focuses on how the particular consumers are
using the mark and whether that specific use is a trademark use.208 The court later confusingly seemed to indicate that a
trademark infringement action could lie even if the mark was used in an aesthetically functional way if there was a likelihood
of confusion.209 Another *183 view of the court’s opinion could be that the court was cautioning that if there was some
evidence that the defendant’s use indicated some sponsorship or endorsement then the use would not be aesthetically
functional. Thus, courts would have to carefully review the usage by any alleged infringer to determine if a usage was
functional or not. In many ways, this conflates the likelihood of confusion analysis with the functionality analysis.
e. Vuitton
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit again addressed aesthetic functionality.210 In Vuitton v. J. Young Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit
decided the issue of whether Vuitton’s mark, an “LV” surrounded by floral symbols, which covered luggage, handbags, and
other items, is functional.211 The district court stated that, “[t]he repeated pattern fabric design used on plaintiff’s goods
constitutes the primary decoration of those goods and is a factor in their consumer appeal and saleability and as such is a
functional element of the goods” and cited Pagliero for support.212 The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s finding to the
extent “it found that any feature of a product which contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of the product is, as a
matter of law, a functional element of that product. Neither Pagliero nor the cases since decided in accordance with it impel
such a conclusion.”213 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Pagliero because the mark covering Vuitton’s goods was a registered
mark, “the design has been and is intended, at least in part, to indicate the origin of the products,” and it “satisfies its
consumers’ tastes for beauty.”214 The Ninth Circuit then attempted to clarify the functionality test by explaining:
[The defendant] argues that if a design is” related to the reasons consumers purchase that product,” it is functional. However,
a trademark is always functional in the sense that it helps to sell goods by identifying their manufacturer. The policy
expressed in Pagliero and the cases decided under it is aimed at avoiding the use of a trademark to monopolize a design
feature which, in itself and apart from its identification of source, improves the usefulness or *184 appeal of the object it
adorns. Functional features of a product are features “which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to
purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.” Furthermore, a
trademark, which identifies the source of goods and incidentally serves another function may still be entitled to protection.215
The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court, noting that functionality was a factual question, to determine whether
consumers are purchasing Vuitton goods because of the reputation of quality or prestige related to Vuitton’s
goods--apparently a “legitimate function of a trademark; . . . identifying the source of the product”--or because they are
aesthetically pleasing.216 Notably, the court rejected the argument that “‘protection should also be extended to the trademark’s
commercially more important function of embodying consumer good will created through extensive, skillful, and costly
advertising . . . [because] courts . . . generally confine[] legal protection to the trademark’s source identification function for
reasons grounded in public policy favoring a free, competitive economy.”’217 The court appears to divorce the protection of
consumer goodwill from “quality,” which it seems to equate with identifying the source of the product. The distinction seems
to rest on an understanding that the trademark protection is not “in gross,” protecting the mark from all misappropriation, and
preventing the inhibition of competition trumps concerns with protecting producer goodwill. This case closes the door on the
broad scope of the aesthetic functionality doctrine adopted by Pagliero and its progeny.
f. Au-Tomotive Gold
The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the aesthetic functionality doctrine, specifically the defensive use of aesthetic

functionality.218 In Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., Au-Tomotive Gold was producing and selling
license plates and key chains displaying Volkswagen and Audi trademarks.219 The district court found that Au-Tomotive
Gold’s use of the marks was protected under the aesthetic functionality doctrine because they were not used as source
indicators, and there is an aesthetic quality to the marks that purchasers are interested in having.220 The Ninth Circuit traced
the development of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality from its supposed origin in the First Restatement of Torts to
Pagliero, Job’s Daughters, and Vuitton to the TrafFix decision.221 The court noted that in Vuitton they had limited Pagliero,
and that the competitive necessity test from TrafFix appeared to be the controlling inquiry in aesthetic functionality cases.222
The court rejected Au-Tomotive Gold’s argument “that the trademarks ‘constitute[] *185 the actual benefit the consumer
wishes to purchase”’ and cited Vuitton for the proposition rejecting “the notion that ‘any feature of a product which
contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of the product is . . . a functional element of that product.”’223 The court
then stated that other circuits had rejected the consumer appeal test and noted that the Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, Inc.
case rejected a broad view of aesthetic functionality because “‘it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and
attractive design.”’224 As noted previously, this reasoning should be rejected as a basis for limiting a broad aesthetic
functionality defense. The court stated that this case was somewhat unique because prior cases had limited aesthetic
functionality “to product features that serve an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function.”225
That particular statement attempts to turn functionality on its head. Functionality is designed to apply whether the mark
serves a source identifying function or not.226 Professor McKenna persuasively argues that:
It may be that VW logos are inescapably recognized as VW logos however they are used, but that does not mean that
consumers regard them, when used to adorn key chains and license plate covers, primarily as indicators of the source of the
key chains and license plate covers. The court’s inability to see this distinction was driven by a combination of its mistaken
view that aesthetic functionality is the opposite of source indication and the misimpression that differences in use context do
not matter to the source indication question.227 The court further stated that in this particular case, “the use of [the] marks is
neither aesthetic nor independent of source identification.”228 “[T]he alleged aesthetic *186 function is indistinguishable from
and tied to the mark’s source-identifying nature.”229 The court explained that:
[C]onsumers want “Audi” and “Volkswagen” accessories, not beautiful accessories. This consumer demand is difficult to
quarantine from the source identification and reputation-enhancing value of the trademarks themselves. The demand for Auto
Gold’s products is inextricably tied to the trademarks themselves. Any disadvantage Auto Gold claims in not being able to
sell Volkswagen or Audi marked goods is tied to the reputation and association with Volkswagen and Audi.230 According to
the court, the “entire significance” of the trademarks “lies in the demand for goods bearing those non-functional marks.”231
In rejecting a broad interpretation of aesthetic functionality, the court noted that “[a]ccepting Auto Gold’s position would be
the death knell for trademark protection.”232 Au-Tomotive Gold’s version of aesthetic functionality allowing “a competitor to
trade on any mark simply because there is some ‘aesthetic’ value to the mark that consumers desire . . . distorts both basic
principles of trademark law and the doctrine of functionality in particular.”233
However, that argument seems to prove too much. Clearly, Audi and Volkswagen’s use of the marks on competing goods
and services--such as in the automobile market--would be precluded. However, the question is whether the creation of
demand in the primary market also gives Au-Tomotive Gold the right to control other related markets. While there can be
difficulty in defining the primary market, as discussed previously, the court could have defined the market to include a
merchandising market for automotive manufacturers’ key chains and license plates and asked whether competitors would be
put at a non-reputation related disadvantage if they could not use the marks in that market. The answer to that question would
be yes. Based on the result in Au-Tomotive Gold, all manufacturers of key chains and license plates using Audi and
Volkswagen marks must obtain permission from the trademark holders. If they don’t receive permission, they are foreclosed
from competing in that particular market. Thus, consumers are denied the benefits of lower prices234 and more choice through
competition,235 which *187 undermines one of the overarching purposes of functionality--to preserve competition. Indeed,
mark holders are themselves harmed because their marks may not receive the same level of promotion.236 If you define the
market broadly, as key chains or license plates for automobiles, then competitors presumably would not be put at a
non-reputation related disadvantage because they could produce key chains and license plates--just without the trademarks.237
Courts could use antitrust principles to provide some certainty to market definition in trademark functionality cases.238
The use of Audi and Volkswagen’s trademarks was necessary for Au-Tomotive Gold because consumers want to match their
key chain with their automobile brand. This is similar to two other types of cases where courts have applied aesthetic
functionality. In the first type of case, consumers need to match the color of similar or complementary products, so access to
the trademarks is needed to provide interoperability between the goods. In the second type of case, consumers desire to

express their allegiance or loyalty to a particular brand.239 Importantly, Au-Tomotive Gold did provide disclaimers concerning
its association with the mark holders on its packaging, thus, because the court found a likelihood of confusion, the case
appears to rest on a post-sale confusion theory.240 While this decision provides some certainty in the application of aesthetic
functionality, it sacrifices concerns with legitimate competition to achieve that goal.241 A court could inquire into the primary
motivation of the purchaser and attempt to separate out the trademark function and any other non-reputation related reason as
discussed below.
*188 g. Jay Franco
In Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, Judge Easterbrook revived aesthetic functionality after the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in
Au-Tomotive Gold.242 Franek claimed trademark protection in the round shape of a beach towel.243 After dismissing Franek’s
trademark as functional under the second prong of the Inwood test, Judge Easterbrook applied the aesthetic functionality
doctrine to Franek’s mark.244 In finding the mark aesthetically functional, Judge Easterbrook noted that Franek was
attempting to obtain trademark protection for a “basic element of design” and that the more basic a particular design might
be, the more likely it is to negatively impact competitors.245 The court reasoned that: “A circle is the kind of basic design that
a producer like Jay Franco adopts because alternatives are scarce and some consumers want the shape regardless of who
manufactures it. There are only so many geometric shapes; few are both attractive and simple enough to fabricate cheaply.”246
Three other parts of the court’s analysis merit additional attention. First, the court applied aesthetic functionality to a mark
that was distinctive because of its incontestable status.247 Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, a mark can be distinctive and
still be aesthetically functional.248 Second, the court noted the importance of the option for Franek to get a design patent.249
Franek could have sought a design patent, but did not and thus risked not obtaining protection under trademark law.250
Finally, the court stated that Franek could ensure there is a lack of confusion in the marketplace by using a “distinctive verbal
or pictorial mark on his [product].”251
3. Proposal
Based on an analysis of the relevant case law, it is abundantly clear why commentators characterize this area of the law as
confusing. However, as discussed previously, courts could alleviate some of the confusion by applying a test focused on
consumer motivations as well as competitive necessity based on an inquiry into alternatives. If the primary motivation of the
purchasing consumer is based on a non-trademark function, then aesthetic functionality should apply. If the primary
motivation of the purchasing consumer is based on a trademark function and there are insufficient alternatives to the trade
dress, then aesthetic functionality should apply. In ambiguous factual circumstances or questionable cases, the court should
presume the mark is aesthetically functional. Through the use of both tests *189 and the proposed presumption, competition
will be encouraged and the second purpose of the functionality doctrine will be achieved.
The proposed presumption operates to provide clarity in ambiguous cases--the problem identified by courts in addressing
consumer motivation. As discussed previously, identifying the primary consumer motivation is a factual question. In close
cases, the court should presume that the primary motivation is not related to a trademark function or reputation related
reason, but that some other independent reason exists such as allegiance or loyalty to an organization. However, the court will
examine the evidence to make the decision; and utilize the presumption only in close cases--notably the party with the burden
for production and proof will have to provide evidence of a non-reputation related reason for the asserted usage of the mark.
For example, if the claimed trade dress is the appliques on children’s clothing as in Wal-Mart,252 and assuming the trade dress
is not federally registered, the party claiming trade dress protection will have to produce evidence in the form of surveys or
consumer testimony that the primary consumer motivation for purchasing the item is for a reputation-related reason or
trademark function.253 The party claiming functionality can produce evidence in the form of surveys or consumer testimony
that consumers purchase the clothing because of the appealing nature of the design. If the fact finder determines that both sets
of evidence are credible--that the purchasers may be primarily motivated to buy for either reason, then the court will apply
the presumption and the trade dress will be aesthetically functional. This approach weighs heavily in favor of protecting
competition and ensuring competitors have access to materials necessary to compete.
Applying both tests is helpful because reliance on one may result in an incomplete analysis. For example, a problem with the
first test is that it may be difficult to apply to the registration of new marks or early usage of marks because at that time there
may be insufficient evidence of how consumers perceive the mark if the test for aesthetic functionality focuses on what is
attractive to consumers at that point in time.254 However, an analysis focused on competitive alternatives may be more helpful

and easier to analyze early in the life cycle of a particular mark.255 The next section provides an analysis of how an expanded
view of aesthetic functionality focused on protecting competition can be applied in three specific scenarios.
*190 IV. Potential New Applications of the Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine
The potential new applications of the aesthetic functionality doctrine include the policing of the subject matter between
copyright and trademark law; the use of the doctrine in defensive situations to allow protection for a trademark, but at the
same time excuse certain third party uses; and use of the doctrine in non-defensive manners in industry specific contexts to
allow broad use by competitors of particular types of trademarks. The following material discusses several cases and their
facts to illustrate how aesthetic functionality could be applied in these contexts.
A. Policing the Subject Matter Between Copyright and Trademark Law
It is widely accepted that copyright and trademark protection may overlap.256 However, copyright law has a relatively low
threshold for copyrightable subject matter.257 For example, copyright law may protect a drawing or image of a cartoon
character.258 By contrast, assuming that the drawing or image of the cartoon character serves a trademark purpose--to identify
and distinguish one person’s goods and services from another or indicate the source of the goods and services--then the
drawing or image may receive trademark protection.259 There are some rules in trademark law and copyright law that may
prevent overlap between the two areas of law. For example, in trademark law, titles of copyrighted works may not receive
trademark protection unless the title is part of a series of works.260 Similarly, in copyright law, a slogan cannot be protected,
although it may be protected in trademark law assuming consumers would perceive it as a trademark.261 However, as
trademark subject matter has expanded, so have the opportunities for additional overlap between trademark and copyright
protection.262 Trademark protection is now allowed for sounds, motion images, holographs, odors, and colors.263 Even
“[m]elodies and songs are good candidates for registration and enforcement.”264 “For example, ‘Sweet Georgia Brown,’ the
*191 Harlem Globetrotters’ theme song . . . is registered for ‘entertainment services in the nature of basketball exhibitions’ . .
. .”265 Trade dress offers the opportunity for additional overlap. A particular design or image on a product may receive
copyright protection--such as the design on a sports drink can--and may receive trade dress protection at the same time.266
The aesthetic functionality doctrine could be extended to police the boundary between copyright and trademark law in many
cases. Some subject matter, which might be protected by copyright law instead of trademark law, could be channeled from
trademark to copyright law. Moreover, some subject matter that is no longer protected by copyright law and is in the public
domain could be protected by trademark law. The previously proposed definition of aesthetic functionality could be applied
to boundary cases that present a close call as to whether something is a traditional work of authorship protected by copyright
law. The proposed definition may be particularly helpful when the work of authorship claimed as a trademark is in the public
domain. The functionality doctrine would operate similarly as a boundary between trademark and patent law, and between
trademark and copyright law. As Professor Bell notes:
Surely, no one doubts that both utility patents and copyrights constitute valuable monopolies and that
competitors without such monopolies suffer considerable disadvantages. It seems reasonable to conclude
that if courts bar trade dress claims that would interfere with Congress’s carefully balanced scheme of
utility patent rights, they ought likewise to bar trade dress claims that interfere with copyright law.267
1. Comparing Copyright and Patent Law, and an Examination of Trademark Law
A comparison of the two fields further illuminates whether functionality should be used to police the subject matter of
copyright and patent law. Patent law and copyright law have similar purposes. As stated in the U.S. Constitution, Congress is
empowered to create exclusive rights in writings and discoveries for limited times to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts.268 Patents are directed toward providing an incentive to invent in order to promote the useful arts, and copyrights
similarly provide an incentive to create and distribute to promote the progress of knowledge.269 Both patents and copyrights
are for limited times; *192 although the base term for copyright law is much longer than patent law.270 Thus, patented
inventions and copyrightable works pass into the public domain after the prescribed time period.271 The threshold
requirements for patentability and copyrightability are different as are the processes for obtaining a patent or copyright. In
order to obtain a patent, one must apply for a patent with the United States Patent and Trademark Office and satisfy patent
eligible subject matter, novelty, nonobvious, utility, and disclosure requirements.272 Only after an examination will a patent

issue.273 However, copyright protection can exist with a modicum of creativity and independent creation as soon as the
copyrighted work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, subject to some exceptions.274
The subject matter of copyright law is specifically limited by section 102(b) of the Copyright Act and the idea-expression
dichotomy.275 Copyright law only protects the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves.276 Similarly, the subject matter
of patents is broad, but does not include natural phenomena, abstract ideas, or laws of nature.277 A substantial difference
between copyright and patent law is the presence of a robust fair use exception in copyright law.278 Fair use exempts certain
uses of a copyrighted work from infringement based on a balancing of factors.279 Thus, a certain amount of copying is
allowed assuming generally that the copying does not erode the market for the first work and thus take away the incentive to
create.280 Patent law’s statutory and common law experimental use exceptions are narrower.281 Copyright doctrines concerning
the idea-expression *193 dichotomy and fair use are animated by concerns with allowing and not deterring follow-on
creation, but are also driven by concerns related to free expression.282 While there are similarities between the two areas of
law, there are also significant differences. One important similarity concerns the protection and enrichment of the public
domain, and an important difference is that copyright law concern has a greater concern with free expression than patent
law.283
The fact that copyrighted works are protected without an examination and based on a relatively low threshold creates some
practical problems with treating copyrighted works similarly to patented inventions. First, because the threshold for
protection is so low, works with extremely low levels of creativity are protected. Even a simple design that could serve as a
trademark can be protected. Thus, if a work is characterized as something that would fall within copyrightable subject matter,
then most simple trademarks and some more elaborate trademarks would not be protected by trademark law. This can be
avoided by limiting the application of the policing function of aesthetic functionality to traditional works of authorship such
as characters, literary works and musical works. Second, there is a problem with proof. The function of policing the boundary
between patents and trademarks is made easier because of the availability of documents created during the examination
process and the patent itself. Those documents allow parties to assess whether or not the asserted trade dress is the central
advance in the patent or referred to as providing some utilitarian benefit. But with copyright, it is unlikely such
documentation exists. However, the concern is not with proving that something is “essential to the use or purpose”;284 the
concern is with determining if something falls within certain categories of copyrightable subject matter.
The passage of copyrightable works into the public domain raises problems concerning the usage of those works because of
the law concerning derivative works. For example, although a particular work may enter the public domain another person
may modify that work with minimal creativity and receive copyright protection in the derivative work.285 Even though the
derivative work may not claim use of the public domain work as copyright infringement, a subsequent creator who uses the
public domain work may still infringe the derivative work depending on how the public domain work is used. If trademark
law is used to *194 extend intellectual property protection to the public domain work, then the author of the public domain
work will receive even more protection than the protection they might receive from creating a derivative work. The former
copyright owner will be able to essentially claim trademark protection for copyrightable subject matter for an unlimited time
period and not be subject to copyright law’s limits.
Moreover, the doctrines that protect free expression and limit copyright law’s application in some circumstances, such as the
idea-expression dichotomy and fair use exception, are not present in trademark law. Thus, to the extent there is overlapping
protection for trademark and copyright subject matter, it is possible that copyright law may not provide protection because of
the fair use defense, but trademark law may provide protection. At least one commentator argues that the Constitution
provides limits to federal legislation, such as the Lanham Act, in order to protect the public domain.286 Part of trademark law’s
problem in this instance is the limited and ambiguous nature of trademark defenses, particularly those directed toward free
expression.287 There are several ways trademark law can account for free expression interests--this may signal that trademark
law does an excellent job of protecting free expression, but in fact, this just muddies the waters.288 For example, a commercial
use requirement for trademark law may limit the instances in which free expression interests may be impinged.289 Further, the
traditional fair use defense or nominative fair use may operate similarly.290 However, traditional fair use may not apply to the
extent the allegedly infringing mark is “used as a mark”291 and nominative fair use is only applied in some jurisdictions.292
And for federal dilution, there are exceptions for fair use, news reporting, commentary, and *195 non-commercial use that
may also protect free expression.293 However, the application of the fair use defense, which includes comparative advertising,
parody, criticism, and commenting, is limited by statutory language to uses otherwise than as a mark.294 Interestingly, those
doctrines all favor preventing dilution over free expression concerns because of the use other than as a mark requirement. The
limitation of dilution exemptions to those marks that are used “other than as a designation of source”295 for fair use are
particularly problematic as dilution provides “in gross” rights in a particular mark--and other limitations to dilution actions

have been eroded over time.296
Some courts have also applied a specific test for considering the intersection of free expression concerns and trademark law.
For example, in the Rogers v. Grimaldi case, the court balanced the interest in free expression against the concerns animating
trademark law and created a special test for examining whether titles to creative works would be subject to trademark
infringement claims or not.297 This test has been applied in several cases and appears to be the leading test.298 In Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, the court applied an “available alternatives” test to determine if free expression interests
were properly considered in a trademark case.299 A third approach is to consider the free expression interest in determining a
likelihood of confusion.300 All of these tests consider free expression, but again, along with the multitude of defenses, provide
a confusing array of potential tests. Also, jurisdictions may apply these approaches differently leading to additional
confusion. Thus, while there is some ambiguity in the choice and application of the tests, trademark law does consider free
expression interests. However, none of these tests consider the concern that trademark law may essentially provide enhanced
copyright protection and thus fail to promote knowledge.
2. Dastar and the A.V.E.L.A. Opinions
In Dastar, the Supreme Court considered the intersection of unfair competition law and copyright law.301 In that case, a
copyright owner made a *196 “false designation of origin” claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.302 The claim
essentially was based on a failure to provide attribution to a copyright owner for the use of their work.303 The Supreme Court
rejected the claim reasoning that “origin” under the statute must mean the “origin” of the product itself and not the underlying
copyrighted work.304 The Supreme Court noted that it would be impractical to have every potential author receive credit on
every product sold.305 In addressing the argument that the video tape set is a “communicative product”306 and that “origin of
goods” in section 43(a) includes “not merely the producer of the physical item . . . but also the creator of the content that the
physical item conveys,” the Supreme Court raised, in somewhat controversial language, concerns about the intersection of
trademark law and copyright law:
The problem with this argument according special treatment to communicative products is that it causes the Lanham Act to
conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy without
attribution, once a copyright has expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]--including the right to
make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented--passes to the public.” “In general, unless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.” The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are
part of a “carefully crafted bargain,” under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the
invention or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been “careful to caution
against misuse or over-extension” of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or
copyright. “The Lanham Act,” we have said, “does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.” Federal trademark law “has no necessary
relation to invention or discovery,” but rather, by preventing competitors from copying “a source-identifying mark,”
“reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” and “helps assure a producer that it (and not
an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.” Assuming
for the sake of argument that Dastar’s representation of itself as the “Producer” of its videos amounted to a representation that
it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would
create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s “federal right to ‘copy and to use”’ expired copyrights.307 This
language does not definitively delineate the boundary between trademark and copyright law, or specify that trademark law
concerns should be subsidiary to copyright law’s purposes. Despite this cautionary language, other courts have limited Dastar
to cases attempting to use the Lanham Act to create a cause of *197 action for plagiarism.308 However, in a recent
controversial opinion that was later withdrawn and replaced by another opinion, the Ninth Circuit examined whether a party
claiming copyright and trademark ownership over the character “Betty Boop” could stop an alleged infringer from using the
name and image of “Betty Boop” on various merchandise, including a “Betty Boop” doll.309 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
claim based on a problem with the chain of title of the owner, but also rejected the claim for two additional reasons.310 First,
the Ninth Circuit decided that allowing the alleged trademark owner the ability to stop the use of “Betty Boop” runs afoul of
the aesthetic functionality doctrine.311 The Ninth Circuit cited the International Order of Job’s Daughters decision, an example
of the application of defensive aesthetic functionality, in support of its reasoning.312 Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit also cited
Judge Kozinski’s Ninth Circuit opinion concerning the nominative fair use defense, New Kids on the Block, for the
proposition that, “‘[T]he trademark laws do not give the New Kids the right to channel their fans’ enthusiasm (and dollars)
only into items licensed or authorized by them.”’313 Second, the Ninth Circuit cited Dastar for the proposition that allowing
the alleged trademark owner control over a copyrighted work through trademark law would frustrate the purposes of
copyright law by not allowing a copyrighted work to enter the public domain.314 The Ninth Circuit stated: “If we ruled that

A.V.E.L.A.’s depictions of Betty Boop infringed Fleischer’s trademarks, the Betty Boop character would essentially never
enter the public domain. Such a result would run directly contrary to Dastar.”315 The Ninth Circuit noted that, “Dastar held
that where a copyright is in the public domain, a party may not assert a trademark infringement action against an alleged
infringer if that action is essentially a substitute for a copyright infringement action.”316 This characterization of the holding of
Dastar has been criticized as incorrect.317
*198 Several months later, the Ninth Circuit withdrew that opinion and substituted a new opinion that primarily relied upon
an argument concerning the chain of title, but did not discuss aesthetic functionality or the Dastar opinion.318 Before that
opinion issued, several parties, including the International Trademark Association, the Motion Picture Association, and Edgar
Rice Burroughs, Inc., filed briefs in support of a rehearing en banc, essentially arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s first opinion
could mean the death of merchandise licensing.319 The International Trademark Association argued that aesthetic functionality
was severely limited in the Ninth Circuit and that the court misapplied Dastar.320 However, claims that the original
A.V.E.L.A. case would mean the end of merchandising are a little overblown considering that intellectual property owners
could still claim copyright protection over their works.321
*199 Moreover, if the Ninth Circuit decided to follow Vuitton and Au-Tomotive Gold, then a fact intensive question as to
consumer motivation may still exist in the A.V.E.L.A. case. Professor LaFrance has explained this issue:
[I]t can be argued that A.V.E.L.A.’s use of the public domain cartoon image would qualify as functional under Ninth Circuit
standards [in the Vuitton and AuTomotive-Gold cases]. Even if the Betty Boop image developed enough secondary meaning
to qualify as a mark, it would still (for a long time, probably) retain its other identity as an aesthetically appealing character
image that was once protected by copyright. Consumers who purchase Betty Boop merchandise might do so because they are
drawn to the attractive Betty Boop image, not because that image is connected with a particular line of merchandise (as in
Vuitton and AuTomotive-Gold) or even a particular organization or institution (as in Job’s Daughters). Thus, a court
evaluating the functionality question would probably have to address, as a question of fact, the true motivation of purchasers,
as it did in Vuitton. Since this issue was not raised by the parties in Fleischer, there was no factual record as to purchaser
motivation, and thus no way to reach a conclusion on the functionality question.
If the evidence shows that consumers are drawn to the Betty Boop image (or any other character image) because it is
inherently appealing, then a second question arises: If consumers find the image appealing not simply because it is cute or
otherwise inherently pleasing, but because they associate it with cartoons or other works of authorship that have depicted the
character, should this “association” be treated as an indication of source or sponsorship, and thus a trademark use? The Ninth
Circuit has yet to resolve this crucial distinction.322 Thus, under one interpretation of Vuitton and Au-Tomotive Gold, a
factual question remains. However, Au-Tomotive Gold could stand for the proposition that if the character serves a
trademark function, then there is no inquiry into aesthetic functionality.
While the Ninth Circuit’s first opinion may have been flawed based on prior case law in the Ninth Circuit concerning
aesthetic functionality and its interpretation of the DaStar case, the concerns expressed by the court in that opinion and under
those particular facts are important. As explained previously, an *200 expansion of the scope of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine could result in greater protection of the public domain with less of an opportunity for trademark law to frustrate the
purposes of copyright law.323 A counter argument is that because trademark law and copyright law concern different
purposes--essentially that copyright law provides an incentive to distribute and create works of authorship and trademark law
serves to reduce consumer deception--trademark law does not provide the same protection as copyright law.324 This is an
argument accepted by many, but ignores the practical effect of how trademark law is used. Trademark law is used to argue
that there will be confusion or dilution any time the mark is utilized, thereby creating copyright-like protection. And, it is
copyright-like protection without the benefit of a broad fair use exception.
While there could be consumer confusion, aesthetic functionality could be construed not to apply to words such as “Betty
Boop,” and the usage of an “officially licensed” designation without permission of the trademark holder of the “Betty Boop”
word mark could be prohibited.325 Thus, to use the word mark “Betty Boop,” a party may still need a license of the trademark
or that party is infringing. The traditional fair use defense or nominative fair use defense could still apply to assess whether
the confusing use is not in good faith or falsely suggests some sponsorship or association with the source of the “Betty Boop”
merchandise. If use of the word mark is allowed by a fair use doctrine, then the “officially licensed” designation could be
used only by the trademark holder or a licensee of the copyrighted work as long as the work was not in the public domain.
There is a risk of post-sale confusion if the mark is not used on the good or the labels are removed. However, post-sale

confusion is a criticized doctrine because no lost sales are involved.326
The test for whether aesthetic functionality applies in this context could turn on the type of subject matter claimed as a
trademark. If that subject matter is *201 traditionally the subject of copyright, then aesthetic functionality will apply and
there will not be trademark protection for the asserted mark. Thus, the aesthetic functionality doctrine, resting on a
justification of policing the boundary of copyright and trademark, could preclude trademark protection for subject matter
traditionally protected by copyright, such as characters, literary works, or musical works, even if there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion or an erosion of the producer’s goodwill.327 In EMI Catalogue Partnership v. Hill, Holliday, Connors,
Cosmopulos Inc., a case predating the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff could not
claim trademark protection in a musical composition protected by copyright law.328 The court noted that the plaintiff could
claim trademark protection in the title of the musical composition, assuming secondary meaning was proven, but that:
[A] musical composition cannot be protected as its own trademark under the Lanham Act. . . . While there are many cases in
which both claims are appropriate, cases involving trademark infringement should be those alleging the appropriation of
symbols or devices that identify the composition or its source, not the appropriation or copying or imitation of the
composition itself. Concluding that a song can serve as an identifying mark of the song itself would stretch the definition of
trademark--and the protection afforded under § 43(a)--too far and give trademark law a role in protecting the very essence of
the song, an unwarranted extension into an area already protected by copyright law.329
Under the proposed definition of aesthetic functionality, a court could find that the claimed mark--a mark in a musical
composition--is one that is prohibited by aesthetic functionality because it is a traditional copyrighted work. The Second
Circuit appears to reason that there is a distinction between the work and the symbol;330 however, there are cases, such as
A.V.E.L.A., where the work is the *202 symbol.331 Moreover, the copyrighted work--a musical composition--could serve as a
symbol or device to identify one person’s goods or services from another’s. Indeed, sound marks are routine. The Second
Circuit could have argued that the musical composition is not distinctive, but it did not do that. It purported to apply a blanket
rule respecting musical compositions narrowly, or perhaps to copyrighted works broadly.332 There could be difficult cases at
the margin. However, similarly to the previously proposed two-prong rule, courts could presume that when a mark qualified
as a copyrighted work and is not in the public domain, the aesthetic functionality doctrine will apply.
The proposed use of aesthetic functionality would allow others to use copyrighted works without any encumbrance by
trademark law.333 Although, courts could still apply the two-prong test proposed previously.
B. Defensive Aesthetic Functionality
Generally, aesthetic functionality bars trademark protection for a mark in all circumstances. As discussed above, a finding of
functionality can trump a likelihood of consumer confusion or dilution, or a concern with protecting producer goodwill.
Defensive aesthetic functionality operates in a different way. Instead of barring all trademark protection for a particular mark,
defensive aesthetic functionality focuses only on an alleged infringer’s particular use. For example, if an alleged infringer is
using mark “X” in a way that makes defensive aesthetic functionality applicable, then the mark “X” is still a valid mark, but
the alleged infringer’s use of that mark is not considered an infringement.334 The first part of this section discusses
merchandising and a recent case where defensive aesthetic functionality could apply. The second part discusses problems
with market definition.
1. Merchandising and University of Alabama Board of Trustees
Defensive aesthetic functionality can be used in cases involving promotional or merchandising uses of trademarks--perhaps
the most criticized expansion of *203 trademark liability for sponsorship, association, and affiliation confusion.335 In these
cases, the defense would find that a particular use--such as the use of a mark on a t-shirt--would be excused, but the
trademark would remain valid. An example of the use of defensive aesthetic functionality could include the A.V.E.L.A. case
and the recent University of Alabama Board of Trustees case.336 In University of Alabama Board of Trustees, the court was
confronted with the question of whether a famous painter was liable to the University of Alabama for trademark infringement
for painting pictures of famous University of Alabama football scenes with players wearing the University of Alabama colors
on their uniforms.337 The district court rejected the University of Alabama’s claims for several reasons, including a First
Amendment defense.338 Although the district court did not primarily rely upon the aesthetic functionality doctrine, it could
have done so and thus avoided addressing a constitutional issue.339 Notably, the importance of functionality was not lost upon

a large group of amici universities who argued that aesthetic functionality should not apply to the case.340 Aesthetic
functionality could have been used to indicate that artists creating artistic works utilizing the trademarks of others are not
liable for any trademark violation. Artists would be *204 almost completely preempted from creating works evoking
University of Alabama football players if they were unable to use the uniform and the crimson and white of Alabama.341
Notably, the district court discussed other uses of the University of Alabama uniforms and colors with other promotional and
merchandising type goods.342 The district court found that those uses could be prohibited on those types of goods, thus
perhaps not implicating the same level of First Amendment concern.343 This is an interesting distinction by the district court
because it seems to rest on the type of medium in which the mark is expressed.344 Thus, traditional types of promotional or
merchandise goods are protected by trademark law, but use of the mark is not protected if it appears on canvas or some other
“traditional” art medium. Both types of uses would seem to include the same meaning despite the difference in medium. The
aesthetic functionality defense could be used to excuse uses on promotional and merchandising goods as a whole, and avoid a
constitutional inquiry concerning the First Amendment. This may be helpful because the *205 justifications for expanding
trademark liability to promotional and merchandising uses is relatively weak despite the value of those uses to trademark
holders.
Importantly, numerous commentators have criticized the expansion of trademark protection to include merchandising and
promotional uses. Professor Bone has offered a very critical analysis of promotional and merchandising uses arguing that
even if there is a likelihood of confusion concerning sponsorship or association in those cases “there is little in the way of
trademark-related harm in merchandising cases, and the substantive policies favoring trademark protection are not strongly
implicated.”345 Professor Bone also argues that, “there is no strong enforcement cost rationale for extending protection as far
as courts do.”346 Professor Bone provides the following convincing example:
[A] firm that sells caps displaying the BOSTON RED SOX name and logo without permission from the Boston Red Sox
organization. A straightforward application of the “digits of confusion” test supports a finding of substantial likelihood of
sponsorship confusion on these facts because Boston Red Sox fans interested in buying the cap might believe that the Boston
Red Sox organization has sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s activity.
However, except possibly for a few fans that want an authorized Boston Red Sox cap, most people are unlikely to be harmed
by the confusion. Red Sox fans want a cap that displays the team name and logo, and they can verify by sight that the
defendant’s cap does that. . . . Moreover, the incentives of the Boston Red Sox organization to develop goodwill in BOSTON
RED SOX as a source identifier are not likely to be impaired by the defendant’s use.347
This example concisely and clearly points out the fact that there is little trademark harm involved in merchandising and
promotional cases, even though confusion may exist.348 Thus, merchandising and promotional rights should not be protected
by trademark law despite the enormous value captured by trademark holders through merchandising. Defensive aesthetic
functionality could be used to separate merchandising and promotional cases from the cases involving sponsorship or
association that may involve some trademark harm.
2. Market Definition
One of the traditional purposes of the aesthetic functionality doctrine is to promote robust competition by ensuring that
competitors have access to marks that may be necessary to compete. The natural question following this statement is what is
the relevant market that the mark is necessary for competition to occur in. It is difficult to know whether competitors need the
mark if the market in which competition may be hindered cannot be clearly identified. Ordinarily, the market would be the
market in which the good or service is sold using that mark; however, this question has become much more complicated with
the influence of modern *206 marketing, merchandising, and the expansion of trademark law. An example of where
defensive aesthetic functionality could apply and a problem with defining markets might arise would be in the context of
children’s toys that are designed to resemble adult-oriented items.349 A simple illustration is a toy truck made in the image of
a “real” truck.350 In General Motors v. Lanard Toys, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court’s finding that a toy
manufacturer’s Hummer replica was infringing and that General Motors’ grille design was non-functional.351 The court stated
that the defined trade dress, “the exterior appearance and styling of the vehicle design which includes the grille, slanted and
raised hood, split windshield, rectangular doors, squared edges, etc.,” does not serve any function.352 The court in that case did
not apply aesthetic functionality.353 However, if defensive aesthetic functionality applied, the asserted trade dress would be
protected from infringement in the market for adult automobiles; however, the doctrine would not protect the asserted trade
dress in the children’s toy market because to do so would foreclose competition in that market and prevent toy manufacturers

from participating in the market for Hummer replica toys. Here, the court should have defined the market as Hummer toy
vehicles. “[W]here the claimed trade dress is actually a type of product, one supplier may not monopolize the configuration
to the exclusion of others.”354 While consumers may expect that a toy manufacturer needs a license to produce toy replica
vehicles, enforcing “officially licensed” designations could modify consumers’ expectations. A more difficult example
involves the marketing practices of LEGO, which involves the related markets of entertainment goods and services for
children. The prior example involved goods directed generally at two different markets: toy vehicles for children and vehicles
for adults. The company LEGO has traditionally made plastic bricks as children’s toys. This arguably was the primary market
the LEGO mark was used in connection with. LEGO now also sells video games featuring LEGO characters (and the
copyrighted and trademarked characters of others) and DVDs with LEGO characters, and operates a LEGO theme park. The
first and most difficult issue is to identify whether the alleged infringer is competing against the mark owner in the mark
owner’s primary market or a merchandising market.355 As discussed before, this is a very difficult issue to resolve because it
can be unclear what the mark owner’s primary markets are *207 because of modern marketing practices, but courts could
rely on antitrust principles.356
In a seminal article, Professor Bell explains the differences between “virtual trade dress” and traditional trade dress and the
problems with market definition:
Virtual trade dress arises when a court gives trade dress protection to exactly the same commodity that
consumers value. Real trade dress has little intrinsic value. Consumers value virtual trade dress for its
own qualities, purely for the aesthetic experience that it provides. Consumers value real trade dress
primarily because it reveals the otherwise hidden qualities of a good or service, whereas virtual trade
dress points to other qualities only incidentally, if at all.357
Thus, virtual trade dress is the actual thing the consumers want to purchase. Professor Bell provides the example from
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. where the court found that Hartford House’s design of a greeting card was
protected trade dress.358 Professor Bell notes that in analyzing the functionality of “virtual trade dress, what counts as an
‘alternative’ design depends on the definition of the relevant market.”359 If the market is defined broadly to include greeting
cards, then the trade dress is nonfunctional.360 If the market is defined narrowly to include “nonoccasion, emotionally
expressive greeting cards characterized by a hand-crafted appearance and free verse,” the trade dress should be functional and
not protected.361 But, that is not what the court did.362 Thus, assuming a broad market definition, what the court protects is an
actual product line itself.363 That cannot be the correct result and essentially results in copyright protection.364 An example of a
court applying a narrow definition of a product market occurred in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC.365 In
that case, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the color, shape, and size of Dippin’ Dots ice cream was aesthetically
functional.366 The Eleventh Circuit found that the asserted trade dress was functional by characterizing the market narrowly as
the “flash-frozen ice cream *208 business” as opposed to the broader definition of “ice cream business.”367 The Court
reasoned that:
[T]he color, shape, and size of dippin’ dots are “aesthetic functions” that easily satisfy the competitive necessity test because
precluding competitors like FBD from copying any of these aspects of dippin’ dots would eliminate all competitors in the
flash-frozen ice cream market, which would be the ultimate non-reputation related disadvantage. Therefore, DDI’s argument
that FBD could still compete in the ice cream market by producing, e.g., soft-serve ice cream, which would not have many of
the same functional elements as dippin’ dots and thus would not infringe upon DDI’s product trade dress, is unavailing. FBD
does not want to compete in the ice cream business; it wants to compete in the flash-frozen ice cream business, which is in a
different market from more traditional forms of ice cream.368
In this case, there was evidence that the particular size and shape of the dippin’ dots was necessary to produce a certain taste
and preserve the ability of the ice cream not to stick together--to “facilitate[] the product’s free flowing nature.”369 However,
the court relied upon that evidence to demonstrate utilitarian functionality under the traditional Inwood test.370 That evidence
is relevant to the determination of aesthetic functionality because it helps define the market narrowly to include a particular
type of ice cream--flash frozen ice cream.371 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit arguably collapsed utilitarian functionality into its
analysis of aesthetic functionality with the competitive necessity test.372 Interestingly, if the product did not have the same
“utility” for that market, would the Eleventh Circuit have found the trade dress to be aesthetically functional? If there was
evidence that the product size, color, and shape were attractive to customers independent of “utility”--customers prefer the
look of small round balls of ice cream--the court could, under prior case law, find that the alleged trade dress was
aesthetically functional in the flash frozen ice cream market that serves ice cream of a similar size. Notably, the Eleventh
Circuit cited the treatise Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies for the proposition that,

“‘functionality . . . is not to be determined within the broad compass of different but interchangeable products; the doctrine of
functionality is intended to preserve competition within the narrow bounds of each individual product market.”’373 Despite
this language, courts could still define individual product markets in a broader fashion depending upon the particular type of
product and the likelihood of product submarkets and, as discussed before, antitrust law may provide some *209 guidance.374
The positive point in favor of use of defensive aesthetic functionality is that it provides the benefit of flexibility for courts to
account for the negative impact of the use of trade dress protection on competition.
C. Non-Defensive Aesthetic Functionality in Industry Specific Contexts
The last type of usage of the aesthetic functionality doctrine could be in industry specific contexts. For example, a particular
type of mark may be necessary to compete in an industry and foreclosing the usage of that type of mark in an entire industry
may stifle innovation in that industry. In the patent field, Professors Burk and Lemley have proposed that the courts utilize
“policy levers” to calibrate the law to the idiosyncrasies of innovation in different industries.375 For example, because
biotechnology innovation may proceed differently than innovation in the computer software industry, courts could use
doctrines like obviousness, utility, or infringement standards to optimize innovation in each field.376 The requirement of
nonobviousness and infringement standards could be used to allow narrow patents with narrow scope.377 This may prevent a
patent holder from impeding innovation in a field where the patent holder’s contribution is minimal. The authors do not,
however, advocate for industry specific statutory patent law because of issues concerning influence by industry groups and
the high level of detail that would be involved in any such legislative scheme.378
In trademark law, the aesthetic functionality doctrine could be viewed as a “policy lever” used by courts to ensure that
competitors are able to compete in a particular industry. Similarly to patent law, a way to avoid or lessen industry lobbying
for industry specific trademark law would be to allow courts to determine when competitors should be allowed to use certain
subject matter in particular industries. A recent district court did just that in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent
America, Inc.379 In that case, the designer of expensive women’s shoes used the color red on a sole of a shoe as a trademark.380
Indeed, the color became well known in the industry and amongst consumers for that particular type of good.381 A competitor
later used the same particular shade of red, the so-called “Chinese Red” on the soles and outsoles of its shoes, prompting the
designer of the *210 shoes to sue the competitor for trademark infringement among other causes of action.382 The district
court decided that competitors would be disadvantaged in the fashion industry if only one particular participant could use the
color to impede others from competing.383 The district court noted how the color red served several purposes including
matching clothing and, as the mark owner pointed out, attracting men to women who wear shoes with the red soles.384
Competitors are put at a non-reputation related disadvantage without use of that particular mark and since colors are so
important in this particular industry, the court appeared to go so far as to indicate that colors could never be protected.385
Specifically, in analyzing functionality the court stated:
Louboutin’s claim to “the color red” is, without some limitation, overly broad and inconsistent with the scheme of trademark
registration established by the Lanham Act. Awarding one participant in the designer shoe market a monopoly on the color
red would impermissibly hinder competition among other participants. YSL has various reasons for seeking to use red on its
outsoles--for example, to reference traditional Chinese lacquer ware, to create a monochromatic shoe, and to create a
cohesive look consisting of color-coordinating shoes and garments. Presumably, if Louboutin were to succeed on its claim of
trademark infringement, YSL and other designers would be prohibited from achieving those stylistic goals. In this respect,
Louboutin’s ownership claim to a red outsole would hinder competition not only in high fashion shoes, but potentially in the
markets for other women’s wear articles as well. Designers of dresses, coats, bags, hats and gloves who may conceive a red
shade for those articles with matching monochromatic shoes would face the shadow or reality of litigation in choosing bands
of red to give expression to their ideas.
The effects of this specter--the uncertainty and apprehension it generates--are especially acute in the fashion industry because
of its grounding on the creative elements discussed above. Fashion is dependent on colors. It is subject to temporal change. It
is susceptible to taste, to idiosyncrasies and whims and moods, both of designers and consumers. Thus, at any moment when
the market and the deities of design, by whatever fancy they decide those things, proclaim that “passion” is in for a given
season and must be expressed in red in the year’s various collections, Louboutin’s claim would cast a red cloud over the *211
whole industry, cramping what other designers could do, while allowing Louboutin to paint with a full palette. Louboutin
would thus be able to market a total outfit in his red, while other designers would not. And this impediment would apply not
just with respect to Louboutin’s registered “the color red,” but, on its theory as pressed in this litigation, to a broader band of
various other shades of red which would be available to Louboutin but which it could bar others from using.386 The reasoning
of the court could be extended to include combinations of colors as well as colors alone.387 The usage of aesthetic

functionality by the court could be viewed as the use of a policy lever in trademark law to ensure that competitors in an
industry can use a particular type of mark.388
Unfortunately, there are problems with defining the industry. For example, LEGO produces t-shirts and, although that is not
its primary market, it arguably competes in the “fashion” industry. If LEGO claimed the colors red and yellow as marks in
connection with t-shirts, under an aesthetic functionality doctrine that prohibited colors as trademarks in the fashion industry,
LEGO would not be able to exclude others from utilizing red and yellow with clothing related to building blocks. For
example, a competitor could use the colors red and yellow along with a different shaped building block on the t-shirt even
though there could be some consumer confusion. Another difficult market definition question involves whether the “fashion”
industry only involves clothing to be worn by a person or does it include other accessories--or types of related goods as well,
such as handbags. And, the question exists as to what is an accessory.
The Louboutin district court analogized the fashion industry to the fine art industry.389 Thus, the fine art industry may be
another area where aesthetic functionality could clear usage of a particular type of mark such as color. Notably, *212 some
courts have held that an artist cannot protect a particular style of art under trademark law;390 although other cases appear to
take the contrary view.391 The use of aesthetic functionality as a policy lever for industry specific use may ensure that
competition is not hindered.
V. Conclusion
The functionality doctrine is a mess. However, within that mess, the aesthetic functionality doctrine promises to provide
much needed breathing space for the public domain, innovation, and competition. While the proposals in this Article are
somewhat radical and run against the grain, the continued expansion of trademark law should not be allowed to cabin the
public domain, suppress innovation or inhibit competition. Trademark law is not patent or copyright law and should not be
used to stifle competition.
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made the functionality doctrine inconsistent, confusing, and opaque.”).

136

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001).

137

See id. (discussing the issue in the case).

138

Id.

139

Id. at 29-30.

140

Id. at 30.

141

See id. at 32-33 (explaining why the Court of Appeals’ analysis was incorrect).

142

TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-34.

143

Id. at 32.

144

Id. at 33.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.

149

Id.

150

See, e.g., Weinberg, supra, note 80, at 329-34 (discussing two functionality bars: “the ‘high bar’ forbid[ing] alternatives analysis
for useful design features [and the] ‘low bar’ permit[ting] alternatives analysis for aesthetic design features”).

151

See Bone, supra note 19, at 2165 (noting ambiguity in the apparent TrafFix two test approach).

152

In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1337-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982).

153

See Weinberg, supra note 80, at 332-33 (“Some of the bow maker’s design elements...were ‘clearly functional,’ while other
elements...were ‘ornamental’ and did not affect the device’s operation.”).

154
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